By: Bambang Irawan (Independent Observer of Security Issues and Lecturer at Universitas Pamulang)
Last year, the United States significantly escalated the use of sanctions, targeting an increasing number of individuals and entities. Sanctions have become a favored tool in the realm of foreign policy, wielded with growing precision. However, the question remains: do sanctions truly accomplish their intended goals?
A recent analysis from the Center for a New American Security focused on US sanctions in 2022, revealing a substantial increase in the number of individuals and entities added to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list. This surge in sanctions was primarily driven by the US response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Washington employs sanctions as a foreign policy instrument, both unilaterally and in collaboration with other nations or international bodies like the United Nations. Key tools for imposing sanctions include the SDN list and export controls through the Entity List. Sanctions can be applied based on various themes, such as human rights and counterterrorism, and can be specific to particular countries. They can target individuals, corporations, financial institutions, government agencies, and more. Additionally, the US can utilize its dominant position in the global economy and financial system to impose secondary sanctions on non-American entities or individuals engaged in business with sanctioned entities.
The concept of sanctions has deep historical roots but has evolved over time. While the US has previously used embargoes against specific countries, these embargoes are often seen as blunt instruments with limited success. More recently, sanctions have become more surgically targeted, with Washington imposing sanctions on specific individuals and entities and relying on financial tools more than broad embargoes.
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has reignited debates about the effectiveness of sanctions. Thus far, multilateral sanctions against Russia have not compelled Moscow to withdraw, though it is premature to fully evaluate their impact. Historical examples provide clearer insights. The decades-long US trade embargo on Cuba has failed to achieve the goal of regime change, and sanctions on North Korea have not deterred Pyongyang from pursuing its nuclear weapons program. Similarly, the punitive sanctions on Iraq that commenced in 1990 did not achieve their stated objectives.
Analysts like Agathe Demarais and Nicholas Mulder acknowledge that sanctions often fall short but can occasionally succeed. For instance, US financial pressures influenced the UK to abandon its 1956 invasion of Egypt. Many within the US foreign policy community view the Obama administration’s use of sanctions against Iran as a successful example, as it collaborated with international partners to impose significant economic costs on Iran while presenting a clear path for sanctions relief, eventually leading to Iran’s agreement to limit its nuclear program. In 2018, the Trump administration effectively employed sanctions against Turkey to secure the release of an American pastor from prison.
Sanctions are more likely to be effective when those applying them hold leverage over the target country. Success is often observed when sanctions are applied to countries with which the US has substantial economic ties or when working in conjunction with nations that have significant economic connections to the target country. In contrast, North Korea’s economic isolation and close relations with China and Russia have diminished the impact of sanctions.
The clarity and feasibility of the objective also play a crucial role in the success of sanctions. The Turkish government, for example, did not willingly comply with US pressure to release the pastor, but the economic costs of sanctions outweighed the political risks. In the case of Iran, the Obama administration achieved the specific goal of pressuring Tehran to engage in a nuclear deal. However, sanctions intended for regime change or those with broad, vague objectives tend to fail. Governments may be willing to make difficult compromises in response to sanctions, but they are unlikely to relinquish power or take actions perceived as existential threats to their survival.
Some proponents argue that sanctions can induce economic hardships, prompting a population to demand leadership change. However, as Demarais points out, sanctions are less effective in autocracies, where the population has limited voice and faces severe consequences for dissent. Sanctions are also more successful when they bring about quick change, before a country can adapt to the economic burden.
Even when sanctions fall short of their objectives, they can still serve a purpose. They convey a message and provide a tool that is more potent than diplomatic statements but less risky than military intervention. Over time, sanctions can erode a country’s ability to wage war or expand its influence.
Nonetheless, the advantages of sanctions in foreign policy must be weighed against the costs. Broadly applied sanctions can lead to immense human suffering that persists for decades. Autocratic regimes can use sanctions to shift blame for their own governance failures. Moreover, sanctions often yield unintended consequences, potentially backfiring and harming US foreign policy and economic interests. Once imposed, it becomes politically challenging for Washington to lift sanctions without obtaining concessions in return. Overreliance on ineffective sanctions can erode the credibility of this tool and prompt countries to seek alternatives to the US-led financial system.
The United States is not alone in employing sanctions, but due to its economic size and influence, it wields significant impact. Sanctions will continue to be a favored foreign policy instrument for Washington, yet their ultimate effectiveness in advancing US interests remains uncertain.